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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
I. 
 
On August 14, 1992, Geoffrey Walton filed an application 
for child's disability insurance benefits under the Social 
Security Act based on his deceased father's employment 
record. Walton alleged an onset date of disability of June 
13, 1966, the day before his twenty-second birthday. 
Appellee Kenneth Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security 
("the Commissioner"), denied the application. Walton then 
filed the present action in the District Court which granted 
the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment. W alton 
appeals. 
 
II. 
 
Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the United States Code 
authorizes appeals from final decisions r endered by the 
Commissioner "within sixty days after the mailing to [the 
applicant] of notice of such decision or within such further 
time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow." 
Shortly before oral argument the Commissioner moved to 
dismiss this appeal on the ground that W alton's resort to 
the District Court was untimely, and it, ther efore, lacked 
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jurisdiction. "[T]he 60-day requir ement is not jurisdictional, 
[however, and] constitutes [only] a period of limitations." 
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 478 (1986). 
Defenses based on limitations can be waived. Because the 
Commissioner failed to brief this issue on appeal, the issue 
is waived. See id. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
Walton claims that he is entitled to benefits based on his 
mental illness, bipolar disorder--manic depr ession. In order 
to receive benefits, Walton must show, among other things, 
that he has a disability which began prior to his twenty- 
second birthday. See 20 C.F.R. S 404.350. A "disability" is 
"the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment which can be expected to result in death or 
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 
continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. 
S 404.1505(a). To meet this definition, claimants "must 
have a severe impairment, which makes[them] unable to 
do [their] previous work or any other substantial gainful 
activity which exists in the national economy." Id. 
 
Walton, who is presently disabled and r eceiving 
Supplemental Security Income Disability Benefits, has a 
long history of suicide attempts, hospitalization, and 
treatments by a series of psychiatrists. He wasfirst 
diagnosed as having bipolar-manic depr ession in 1971 
when he was twenty-six years of age, and the 
contemporaneous medical records fr om the period after 
that date are extensive. While the contemporary medical 
records from the preceding period are considerably more 
limited, they do bear evidence that Walton's mental 
impairment originated prior to 1971. The ALJ was thus 
confronted in 1994 with the difficult task of determining 
whether Walton's progressive mental impairment rose to 
the level of a disability prior to his twenty-second birthday 
on June 13, 1966. 
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Walton testified that he attended T rinity College in 
Connecticut from 1962 until June of 1964, when he was 
asked to leave and withdrew. He retur ned to Trinity in 
1965, but again found himself on academic pr obation in 
February, 1966, when he again withdrew. After dropping 
out the first time, Walton saw a psychiatrist, Dr. Howard 
Wood, weekly. Walton had his first manic experience in the 
summer of 1965 and saw a psychiatrist once a week for six 
months during that year. His first suicide attempt came in 
1967, and he saw Dr. Wood again that year for 
approximately six months. 
 
By 1994, Dr. Wood was no longer in practice and had not 
retained records relating to his observations of Walton. The 
only contemporaneous written record available from the 
early sixties is a letter from Dr. Charles C. Schober, whom 
Walton consulted in 1964 for "emotional pr oblems." Dr. 
Schober wrote to Walton's draft boar d on August 14, 1964, 
in support of an application for a deferment. He there 
reported that Walton "has periods of apathy and depression 
coupled with a tendency to rebel seriously which inhibits 
his performance and productivity." Record 162. In Dr. 
Schober's opinion, these problems would "hamper his 
performance in the military service." Id. 
 
B. 
 
At the hearing, the ALJ listened to Walton's account of 
the progression of his illness and solicited the reaction to 
that account of Dr. Morris Rubin, a psychologist and 
vocational expert.1 The ALJ r ecognized that some mental 
disorders, including the sort from which W alton suffers, 
take time to recognize and diagnose. He also noted that, 
while it seemed clear that Walton suf fered from a mental 
impairment rising to the level of disability at some point in 
his life, the timing of the disability's onset was uncertain: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In his resume, Dr. Rubin describes his current occupation as 
"Counseling/Consulting-Psychologist." He has earned a B.S. in 
psychology, an M.S. in Psychology Guidance, and an Ed.D. in Psychology 
Guidance. He has worked as a certified school psychologist and as a 
vocational advisor. 
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       ALJ: The picture . . . Dr. Rubin, after '71 gets clear, I 
       think. 
 
       [Dr. Morris Rubin]: Yes, much clearer. 
 
       ALJ: Because there's a hospitalization which is used. 
       All with clear information. And then six 
       hospitalizations follow. And the period befor e that--of 
       course, a lot of this is just a problem of documentation 
       that occurs [due] to passage of time plus as you 
       mentioned to Dr. Rubin, I believe, or Mr . Walton did is 
       that there's a sort of reluctance of diagnoses in this type 
       of thing until after a period of time has passed. 
 
       * * * 
 
       ALJ: So this is not an unusual pattern we'r e seeing 
       here. 
 
       Dr. Rubin: Not an unusual pattern. 
 
       ALJ: But it still leaves me with the pr oblem of drawing 
       a line at a particular point. It obviously was not before 
       age 14. 
 
       * * * 
 
       ALJ: . . . [U]nfortunately, Mr. W alton has had a 
       problem since . . . [a]ge 14, which is very significant 
       and is very clear in the present and we'r e right at that 
       point in time where I have to make a decision as to 
       where to draw the line. Age--it's somewher e between 
       14 and 23, I would think, or 24, or 25, or [in 1971]. 
       And it's an unusual case in that the line seems to 
       hover very close around that point in time. . .. It's a 
       difficult--I think this is a difficult line for me to draw. 
 
Record 80-83 (emphasis added). 
 
The ALJ personally elicited Dr. Rubin's opinion on the 
onset issue. Dr. Rubin opined that Walton's 1967 suicide 
attempt was an expression of the severity of W alton's 
impairment at that time. Dr. Rubin further regarded it as 
likely that Walton was unable to work on a continuing basis 
after the age of fourteen: 
 
        ALJ: . . . Dr. Rubin, want [sic] to volunteer anything 
       here? I think it's a fuzzy, fuzzy period that year or two 
       in there. 
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        Dr. Rubin: It's hard to explain, Y our Honor. But if we 
       liken it, if I may say, expressed in feeling, if I can liken 
       his educational experiences from 14 years of age up, 
       certainly if we turn it into some sort of employment, he 
       wouldn't be able to hold positions for any length of 
       time, but we'd have the mood swings. He would run 
       into difficulty. But it's difficult to say whether he would 
       be an employable constantly. 
 
       * * * 
 
        . . . [A]s it's shown here, in my opinion, he would 
       have a lot of difficulty holdings [sic] jobs for long 
       periods of time or reasonable periods of time for the 
       satisfaction of an employer. Probably get fired a lot of 
       times or even quit. Got in a mood, he would quit. 
 
Record 84-85. 
 
In addition to contemporaneous medical recor ds, Walton 
tendered letters authored in the early nineties by doctors 
who had treated him at various times in the past: Dr. 
Howard Wood; Dr. Henry D. Cornman, III;2 Dr. JohnW. 
Goppelt; and Dr. Robert Gibbon. Dr. W ood reported that he 
treated Walton when he dropped out of college but did not 
remember his diagnosis: "I don't remember exactly what my 
diagnosis was, but I don't believe I recognized him as 
manic-depressive. He seemed to be a disturbed adolescent. 
I have had several patients whose bipolar pictur e only 
became evident after a period of years." Recor d 255. Dr. 
Cornman reported that during high school Walton "became 
withdrawn, isolated and lost interest in everything." Record 
254. He also reported that Walton's par ents had provided 
his support all of his life and that he, Dr. Cornman, could 
"confirm that . . . Walton was disabled before his 22nd 
birthday." Id. Dr. Goppelt opined: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The ALJ describes Dr. Cornman"as a neighbor, . . . not a professional 
treating source." Record 30. Dr. Cornman reported in 1992, however, 
that he had treated Walton for "the past ten years." Record 254. He 
simply supplements his ten years of clinical familiarity with Walton's 
condition by noting that he had been friendly with W alton and his family 
since the 1940s. 
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        In my opinion the psychiatric diagnosis in Geof frey's 
       case is incomplete unless it includes personality 
       disorders, which Geoffrey never mentions. He shows 
       elements of the histrionic disorder and the anti-social 
       disorder, along with a bipolar disor der which has 
       responded poorly to treatment, in part because 
       Geoffrey has often not cooperated with his treatment. 
 
Record 257. 
 
In his report, Dr. Gibbon states that"by virtue of his 
mental condition, [Walton] has not been sustainably 
employable in the open job market" and that "[i]n the first 
fifteen years out of high school, he held about half a dozen 
jobs, typically for three months." Recor d 271. 
 
C. 
 
In his decision, the ALJ found Dr. Wood's letter 
significant only because it reflected, in the ALJ's view, that 
Walton had been seen "not for manic depr ession but for 
adolescent disturbance." Record 30. The ALJ dismissed Dr. 
Cornman as "not a professional tr eating source" and Dr. 
Gibbon's report as "clearly based upon infor mation 
provided by [Walton] and not upon Dr. Gibbon's own 
observation of [Walton] prior to his 22nd birthday." Id. The 
ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Goppelt's report was as follows: 
 
       Dr. Goppelt, in his treatment of the claimant, actually 
       was apparently convinced that Mr. W alton could more 
       readily be defined as subject more to personality and 
       anti-social disorder than bipolar disor der. Further, he 
       believed that the claimant's emotional condition was 
       currently poorly controlled basically because of the 
       claimant's own irresponsibility and lack of cooperation. 
 
Record 31. The ALJ's decision makes no r eference to Dr. 
Rubin's views on the onset issue. 
 
The ALJ concluded as follows: 
 
       In consideration of the medical documentation as well 
       as reports of the claimant's educational achievement 
       prior to his 22nd birthday and notwithstanding the 
       claimant's allegations or those of his neighbor Dr . 
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       Cornman, or Dr. Gibbon, the Administrative Law Judge 
       finds that Mr. Walton may have been treated for some 
       adolescent disturbance in 1964 or 1965. He was able 
       to acquire a draft deferment when he left school. The 
       method by which this result was achieved is certainly 
       not indicative of either ongoing mental or emotional 
       disorganization. There is no contemporaneous further 
       record of his receiving treatment for severe emotional 
       or mental impairment through June 14, 1966. It is the 
       opinion of this administrative law judge that the fact 
       that the claimant was not in school at the time he 
       achieved his 22nd birthday is not dispositive of any 
       ongoing emotional impairment. Noteworthy is the fact 
       that student unrest in many forms was pr evalent in 
       colleges throughout the nation at that time. 
 
       * * * 
 
       FINDINGS 
 
       * * * 
 
       5. Prior to attaining age 22, the claimant had the 
       following medically determinable impair ments: 
       adolescent disturbance, which was not severe in 
       nature. 
 
       6. The claimant is not under a "disability" as defined in 
       the Social Security Act, which began before he attained 
       age 22. 
 
App. at 32-33. 
 
IV. 
 
A. 
 
Social Security Rulings "are binding on all components of 
the Social Security Administration." 20 C.F .R. 
S 402.35(b)(1). Social Security Ruling 83-20 ("SSR 83-20) is 
of particular pertinence here: 
 
        With slowly progressive impair ments, it is sometimes 
       impossible to obtain medical evidence establishing the 
       precise date an impairment became disabling. 
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       Determining the proper onset date is particularly 
       difficult, when for example, the alleged onset and the 
       date last worked are far in the past and adequate 
       medical records are not available. In such cases, it will 
       be necessary to infer the onset date from the medical 
       and other evidence that describe the history and 
       symptomatology of the disease process. 
 
       * * * 
 
        In determining the date of onset of disability, the 
       date alleged by the individual should be used if it is 
       consistent with all the evidence available. When the 
       medical or work evidence is not consistent with the 
       allegation, additional development may be needed to 
       reconcile the discrepancy. However , the established 
       onset date must be fixed based on the facts and can 
       never be inconsistent with the medical evidence of 
       record. 
 
       * * * 
 
        In some cases, it may be possible, based on the 
       medical evidence to reasonably infer that the onset of 
       a disabling impairment(s) occurred some time prior to 
       the date of the first recorded medical examination. . . . 
       How long the disease may be determined to have 
       existed at a disabling level of severity depends on an 
       informed judgment of the facts in the particular case. 
       This judgment, however, must have a legitimate 
       medical basis. At the hearing, the administrative law 
       judge (ALJ) should call on the services of a medical 
       advisor when onset must be inferred. 
 
       * * * 
 
        If reasonable inferences about the pr ogression of the 
       impairment cannot be made on the basis of the 
       evidence in file and additional relevant medical 
       evidence is not available, it may be necessary to 
       explore other sources of documentation. Information 
       may be obtained from family members, friends, and 
       former employers to ascertain why medical evidence is 
       not available for the pertinent period and to fur nish 
       additional evidence regarding the course of the 
       individual's condition. 
 
                                9 
  
       * * * 
 
        The available medical evidence should be considered 
       in view of the nature of the impairment (i.e., what 
       medical presumptions can reasonably be made about 
       the course of the condition). 
 
SSR 83-20. 
 
This is a case involving a previously hospitalized claimant 
alleging disability on the basis of a psychiatric impairment. 
That impairment was a slowly progr essive one and the 
alleged onset date was far in the past. Adequate medical 
records for the most relevant period were not available. This 
meant that it was "necessary to infer the onset date from 
the medical and other evidence that describe the history 
and symptomatology of the disease process." An "informed 
judgment" was required, a judgment with a "legitimate 
medical basis." 
 
B. 
 
Here, with the arguable exception of Dr . Wood's having no 
affirmative recollection of having r ecognized Walton as a 
manic depressive prior to his twenty-second birthday, all of 
the medical evidence suggested an onset prior to that 
birthday.3 To be sur e, that evidence was not based upon 
personal observation of Walton prior to age twenty-two. 
Nevertheless, the ALJ could not, consistent with SSR 83-20 
and the necessity of establishing an onset date based on 
substantial evidence, simply ignore that evidence and draw 
an inference from the record evidence having no substantial 
medical support. Because there is no legitimate medical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We find no support for the ALJ's interpretation of Dr. Goppelt's 
letter. 
Dr. Goppelt did not opine that W alton was more accurately diagnosed as 
having a "personality and anti-social disorder than [a] bipolar disorder." 
Record 31. His opinion was that Walton suffered from both bipolar- 
manic depression and a personality and antisocial disorder. Similarly, 
Dr. Goppelt's letter did not attribute W alton's condition to 
"irresponsibility." He did report that Walton's condition has "responded 
poorly to treatment, in part because [he] has often not cooperated with 
his treatment." Record 257. Dr. Goppelt explained, however, that 
Walton's poor cooperation is the result, not the cause, of his illness. 
Id. 
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basis for the conclusion of the ALJ on the onset issue, we 
will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand 
with instructions to return this matter to the Commission 
for further proceedings. 
 
Given the record evidence concerning the period of time 
frequently necessary to diagnose a bipolar disorder like 
Walton's, we conclude that Dr. W ood's letter concerning his 
failure to diagnose Walton as a manic depressive prior to 
age twenty-two would not alone provide a basis for a post- 
twenty-one onset date even if Dr. Wood had a clearer 
recollection about Walton's case. 
 
Moreover, SSR 83-20 and the substantial evidence rule 
dictate, we conclude, that an ALJ in a situation of this kind 
must call upon the services of a medical advisor rather 
than rely on his own lay analysis of the evidence. Our 
conclusion on this issue is consistent with those r eached 
by our sister courts of appeals in similar situations. See 
Grebenick v. Chater, 121 F.3d 1193, 1201 (8th Cir. 1997) 
"[i]f the medical evidence is ambiguous and a retroactive 
inference is necessary, SSR 83-20 requir es the ALJ to call 
upon the services of a medical advisor to insur e that the 
determination of onset is based upon a `legitimate medical 
basis' "); Bailey v. Chater, 68 F .3d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(mandating enlistment of a medical expert when onset is 
ambiguous despite SSR 83-20's apparently per missive 
language); Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 362 (1993) ("We 
therefore hold that in cases involving slowly progressive 
impairments, when the medical evidence r egarding the 
onset date of a disability is ambiguous and the Secr etary 
must infer the onset date, SSR 83-20 requir es that that 
inference be based on an informed judgment. The Secretary 
cannot make such an inference without the assistance of a 
medical advisor."); DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 848 
(9th Cir. 1991) ("In the event that the medical evidence is 
not definite concerning the onset date and medical 
inferences need to be made, SSR 83-20 r equires the 
administrative law judge to call upon the services of a 
medical advisor and to obtain all evidence which is 
available to make the determination."); Blankenship v. 
Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1122-24 (6th Cir . 1989); Lichter v. 
Bowen, 814 F.2d 430, 434-436 (7th Cir . 1987). 
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Ironically, the ALJ in this case appear ed to recognize his 
need for expert help and noted during the hearing that he 
"might possibly feel the need to secure a[`medical expert'] 
subsequently." Record 42. Perhaps because of this concern, 
the ALJ treated Dr. Rubin at the hearing as both a medical 
advisor and a vocational expert. When deciding the case, 
however, he chose to ignore Dr. Rubin's views without 
comment. Having secured the professional opinion of a 
licensed psychologist, we conclude the ALJ was not entitled 
to disregard it without articulated r eason. As we have 
explained on numerous occasions, we are unable to 
conduct our substantial evidence review if the ALJ fails to 
identify the evidence he or she rejects and the reason for its 
rejection. See Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 
F.3d 112,119-20 (3d Cir. 2000); Schaudeck v. Comm'r of 
Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d. Cir. 1999); Barren 
Creek Coal Co. v. Witmer, 111 F .3d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 1997); 
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d. Cir. 1981). 
 
Finally, we conclude that the ALJ, even if he had had the 
assistance of a medical advisor, could not have rejected the 
opinion of Dr. Gibbon, a treating physician, solely on the 
basis that his opinion was based on information supplied 
by Walton and not on personal observation of Walton 
during the relevant period. As SSR 83-20 clearly reflects, a 
conclusion regarding onset in a situation of this kind can, 
and frequently must, be based on information gathered 
after the fact from the claimant and, indeed, from other lay 
people like family and neighbors. The basis for a medical 
opinion is, of course, an indispensable element of a 
reasoned evaluation of it, and there ar e, of course, 
situations in which an opinion based on personal 
observation may be favored over one based on information 
supplied by the claimant. But this is a situation in which 
an opinion based on personal, contemporaneous 
observation was not available. In such a situation, SSR 83- 
20 calls for an ALJ to have the benefit of expert medical 
advice based on the best available data without r egard to 
its source. 
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V. 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and 
remand with instructions to return this matter to the 
agency for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
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